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Increasing levels of technology have changed the task of flying modern
helicopter cockpits by allowing many crew functions to be performed
automatically. This study attempted to understand the relation between
automation and helicopter crew coordination. Twenty-eight helicopter pilots
were assigned to two-person crews and asked to fly a simulated mission in
either automated or manual conditions using a low-fidelity helicopter
simulator. Communication was transcribed and coded into a nine-category
content classification system by two trained raters. The inter-rater reliability
was +.84. Results indicated that a higher frequency of total communications
was demonstrated during manual flights. The interaction of Pilot Position by
Automation Level was significant (p<.05) for three of the communication
content categories: Observations, Suggestions, Statements of Intent. The
results are discussed in terms of their implications for communications and
Crew Resource Management (CRM) training for crews flying advanced
technology helicopters.
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INTRODUCTION

Effective communication is paramount in an aircraft cockpit. It must occur
among crew members, and it must occur so that both pilots reach a mutual
level of understanding, not only of their aircraft, but of each other's
responsibilities. Without this understanding, safety may be compromised.
It is becoming more evident that communication patterns and content
vary with changes in the aircraft. These changes may be a cause for concern
(see Wiener, 1991). In the current helicopter market there is a growing trend
toward new sophisticated displays on glass cockpit screens. Flight
Management Systems and Electronic Flight Instrumentation Systems are
becoming available in modern heUcopters, as well as in fixed-wing aircraft. It
is debatable whether this complex technology effectively relates to the quick
eye, hand coordination of helicopter pilots and how this technology impacts
crew coordination and communication. As a matter of fact, forty reports were
listed on helicopter automation and communication in the Aviation Safety
Reporting System.
There is a gap in the available understanding of rotary-wing crew
communication and crew resource management training available for
helicopter crews. More specifically, it involves a leap of faith into a world of
increasing automation without an understanding of how it impacts rotarywing crew communication.

1

2
Statement of the Problem
There have been few studies on the behavioral changes associated with
cockpit automation. However, the existing studies reveal a change in
communication and workload as a consequence of automation (Foushee &
Manos, 1989). Research indicates that there is a growing need to understand
crew communication and to incorporate these understandings into crew
resource management training. A 1992 study reports that the development of
crew training specifically designed to counteract any potential negative effects
of automation may be required as an interim measure in preserving and
enhancing crew performance (Thornton, Brown, Bowers & Morgan, Jr.),
Bowers (1995) states that based on so little empirical data, it is difficult to
describe effective crew interactions in automatic systems. It is even more
difficult to describe effective crew interactions with automatic systems in
rotor craft operations because of the lack of research in rotary-wing crews and
their aircraft. This study will attempt to contribute to this need by expanding
the investigation of automation effects on crew communication to the area of
helicopters.
It is essential to avoid any assumption that fixed-wing aircrews and their
aircraft impose the same type of communication requirements as rotary-wing
crews. Helicopters have a number of unique capabilities that cannot be
duplicated by airplanes (Helicopter Association International, 1981). "The
rotary-wing aircraft's versatility, varied mission assignments, and flightcontrol characteristics are likely to impose a different type of communication
requirement on the crew as compared to fixed-wing aircraft" (Oser, Prince,
Morgan, & Simpson, 1991).
All forms of mass transportation include accidents due to human error,
whether it be a car, train, airplane, or helicopter. In 1989 it was reported that
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human error was the causative factor in approximately 64% of the accidents
involving helicopters (Alkov). Despite the decrease in the number of
helicopter accidents, the causes of the accidents have been shifting more
heavily toward crew involvement (Breiling, 1995). For example, in 1995, the
crew was cited as a major cause in eight of the twelve accidents and in two
incidents recorded by U. S. helicopters.
The Naval Safety Center also reported that aircrew error accounted for 56
of the 96 (58.3%) Naval and Marine Corps Class A helicopter flight mishaps
from 1983 to 1988 (Alkov, 1989). In addition, an analysis of Army aviation
accident data revealed that "failure to communicate critical information" was
one of four identified causes in Army rotary-wing mishap data (Oser et al.,
1991).
In spite of the trend toward the single pilot cockpit, if s likely that twoperson crews will continue to flourish because of the benefit that human
redundancy provides in the cockpit. Human decision-making and judgment
cannot be substituted with any amount of microprocessing power. Twoperson crews increase the flight experience of skill, knowledge, and judgment
from which to draw from when making a decision in the cockpit.
In spite of automated functions, advanced displays and various stability
and control augmentation systems, there still are not cockpit designs a single
pilot can fly with the same performance and workload as two-person crews
can (Hart, 1988). Many next generation helicopters reflect these design
parameters of a two-person cockpit despite increases in automation, such as
the Sikorsky S-92 civil and military version. Although the current fleet are
mostly hybrid cockpits in which most functions remain accomplished
through dedicated hardware, this will not be the case for next generation
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helicopters. As true glass cockpits get built, more and more coordination
problems present themselves (Hamilton, 1997).

Review of the Literature
Automation and crew communication have become important topics in
the human factors research community for more than a decade now.
Automation of fixed-wing aircraft and crew communication appears in the
literature. However, the study of helicopter automation and crew
communication does not appear in the literature. For that reason, the
literature review will address crew communication and helicopter
automation independently before addressing both together.

Crew Communication
Crew communication the flow of information between individual
operators - serves as the coupling agent that determines the function of
the operators as an ensemble (Segal, 1990).

Crew communication has been connected to the performance of crews and
has also been the focus of crew resource management programs. There are
two aspects of the communication process that are particularly relevant to air
crew performance (Kanki, Greaud, & Irwin, 1989). First, communication is
clearly a means by which crews accomplish their task through the
coordination of actions by commands, statements of intent, questions.
Secondly, the "how" and "when" things are communicated as opposed to the
"what" can characterize some quality of the way in which crews interact with
each other (Kanki, Greaud, & Irwin, 1989). Good communication is the glue
that binds a crew together and is essential in two-pilot operations.
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Foushee and Manos (1981) found better crew performance to be associated
with more task relevant speech, commands and acknowledgments. It has
been suggested that the breakdown of communication or less task relevant
speech, commands, and acknowledgments among crew members is the first
step leading to an accident or incident (see Foushee & Manos, 1989). This has
been corroborated in several commercial aviation and helicopter accidents.
In 1983, a Sikorsky S-61 operating under British Airways Helicopters
crashed into the sea while on a scheduled passenger route between Scilly and
the English coastline (Manningham, 1988). Nineteen passengers and a flight
attendant were killed in that accident. The official accident report blamed
"the pilot's failure to detect and correct and unintentional descent while
under VFR rules in poor and deceptive visibility over a calm sea"
(Manningham, 1988). This was clearly a flight in which communication
broke down. Crews must agree on what each will each bring to the cockpit
workload, and then cooperate verbally. "During this flight there was a prime
opportunity to split the work into vertical and horizontal navigation to better
coordinate the flight if only the pilots had verbalized this" (Manningham,
1988).
Another major accident occurred in 1978 with the crash of United Airlines
Flight 173 in Portland, Oregon. The probable cause was determined to be the
failure of the captain to monitor the fuel state, and contributing causes
included "the failure of the other two flight crew members either to fully
comprehend the criticality of the fuel state or to successfully communicate
their concern to the captain" (NTSB, 1979, p.29).
That investigation resulted in the issuance of FAA Air Carrier Operations
Bulletin Number 8430.17 which provided instructions regarding resource
management and interpersonal communications training for air carrier flight
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crews (Kanki & Palmer, 1993). Crew resource management programs have
since made their way into helicopter crew training in both the military and
civilian sectors.
Foushee and Manos (1981) studied crew communication in a simulated
setting which provided a model for much of the communication research
later carried out (Kanki & Palmer, 1993). The goal of their methodology was
to provide specific characterizations of communication patterns associated
with effective crew resource management principles so that pertinent
training implementations could be made (Kanki & Palmer, 1993). Although
crew resource management has been implemented in several helicopter
training programs, it may be limited in effectiveness because it is derived
from commercial aviation; and therefore based on the nature of
communication of fixed-wing pilots. Helmreich states that CRM training
should be customized to reflect the nature and needs of the organization
(1989a).
A recent study addressed the way in which coordination problems are
solved, essentially what it is that differentiates flight crews who are
performing smoothly and effectively from those who are not? (Kanki, Lozito,
& Foushee, 1987). It was found that crews who had recently flown together,
performed better, possibly because these crews simply had increased
opportunity to establish a conventional means of communicating (before
they were task overloaded and time-pressured).
Much of the research on crew communication has been studied with fixedwing crews. It may be that the lack of rotary-wing crew communication
research is due to the diverse helicopter missions and functions, and cost of
simulation. Also, communication research is fairly new, since the first
significant studies were accomplished in the late 1970's and early 1980's.
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A study conducted in 1991 by the Naval Training Systems Center, Human
Factors Division, analyzed rotary-wing crew communication patterns and
content.
They posed the following questions:
• what specific communication patterns and content are demonstrated by
different helicopter crew members?
•

do tactical air crew communication patterns and content vary as a
function of the performance demands and requirements of different flight
conditions?

• Third, they asked: are the communication patterns and content of more
effective air crews different from those of less effective air crews?
• What similarities exist between the communication patterns and content
of military rotary-wing air crews and commercial fixed-wing air crews?
A main goal of their research was to apply what they learned to Aircrew
Coordination Training (ACT). (For a detailed description of results, see
Technical Report 90-009/Oser et al., 1991)
The researchers of that report suggested that specific attention needs to be
focused on the unique communication requirements of tactical rotary-wing
air crews during routine and non-routine flight conditions (Oser et al., 1991).
It was also suggested that subsequent research analyze the communication
patterns and content of tactical air crews in other platforms or aircraft types
(i.e., fixed-wing, tilt-rotor) to extend and test the generality of their findings.
Consequently, communication research continues to evolve out of the
knowledge that pilot skill and technical understanding is not sufficient.
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Helicopter Automation
The first practical helicopter is generally considered to be the VS-300,
designed, built and flown by Igor Sikorsky, who is the man acknowledged as
the foimding father of today's modern helicopters. Sikorsky's first controlled
flight on September 14, 1939 provided the way for many designs to come.
Despite several successful flights, it became evident that the helicopter was
more difficult to fly than almost any other type of aircraft (Carey, 1986). This
is due to the inherently unstable characteristics of the helicopter. It wasn't
until years later with hydraulically boosted, stability augmentation systems,
computer-assisted controls and autopilots that the large helicopter became
easier to fly.
The most basic type of helicopter automation is stability and control
augmentation (Hart, 1988). This permits a pilot to stabilize a helicopter in an
established trim condition as flight conditions or tasks require. For example,
in high speed flight, turn coordination and speed, altitude, and altitude-hold
are necessary to permit pilots to perform other duties (Hart, 1988). During
low-speed flight, sensors are required to detect small deviations in speed,
position, heading, and altitude to provide a stabilized hover without
continuous pilot inputs (Prouty, 1986b). Control augmentation is essential in
low-visibility, nap of the earth operations conducted with helmet-mounted
displays (Aiken, 1984). Recently, the focus of technology has moved from
automating these inner-loop control tasks to outer-loop, higher-order tasks
(Hart, 1988).
Advanced controls and cockpit displays have taken shape in modern day
helicopters. Multi-function displays are replacing the traditional singlepurpose instruments. Weather, flight path and terrain information can be
exhibited on one display. Consequently, the number of individual displays in
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advanced cockpit designs are significantly reduced in comparison to the
number of instruments and displays (in past helicopters) (Hart, 1988).
Helicopter automation has reached a pivotal point in development, because
of receiving great attention from the human factors community. Bob
Spaulding, an engineering test pilot with Sikorsky on the S-92 program,
states, "The point we've reached in cockpit design today, is that we're
relatively happy with the data processing speed, the software, and the quality
of the displays. Now we have to confront the man-machine relationship
head-on" (Harvey, 1993).
From a human factors viewpoint, the implications of cockpit automation
are an unsettled topic. Technology has allowed automation of functions
once performed by humans to computers. High-speed processing and
increased data throughout is allowing helicopter avionics developers to tailor
next-generation equipment to mission needs more closely than ever before.
(Harvey, 1993). Despite the reduction of certain human errors, it appears that
automation may set the stage for new types of errors, such as failures in
programming or mode awareness (see Wiener, 1991).
Human factors considerations, presentation of displays, and cleaner cockpit
arrangements of switches all are on the verge of receiving much greater
attention than previously provided by helicopter avionics designers (Harvey,
1993). Developing helicopters include automated functions to "reduce
workload," however it's questionable whether automation is being added
randomly, without a broad understanding of the consequences. "Automation
for the sake of automation" is not reason enough to utilize this technology.
Hamilton (1997) states that over-automation can lead to the pilot not being
aware of what the helicopter is doing, what his limitations are, and leave him
helpless when the automation fails.
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Helicopter automation will continue to evolve. According to Sandra G.
Hart, considerable research is still needed to define the role pilots should
play, and to determine where computer aiding, automation, and "expert"
systems can provide the most benefit (1988). Along with these technological
advances comes a removal of the pilot further from the actual manipulation
of the aircraft. This evolution is illustrated in Figure 1. "As automation
levels increase, the crew is less able to understand and control the automation
with the result that workload increases and awareness drops" (Hamilton,
1997). With these technological advances that remove the pilots further from
direct control of the aircraft, crew resource management training will become
more important than ever.
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Automation and Aircrew Communication
In the last fifteen years because of the increase in automated flight-decks,
research has begun to address the effect of automation on crew
communication. Recent studies of crew communication in modern "all
glass" cockpits support the argument that changes in the design of displays
and controls result in significant changes in cockpit communication (Costley,
Johnson, & Lawson, 1989).
Earl Wiener and other researchers were the first to raise the concern that
cockpit automation may not lead to an improvement in crew coordination.
In fact crew communication and coordination may gain more importance in
automated systems (Jentsch & Bowers, 1996). Wiener (1984) stated that "the
insertion of automatic devices into man-machine systems inevitably raises
questions . .. which probably apply to helicopters as well as transport aircraft.
He identified the psychosocial aspects of automation as an important research
area.
Only two studies have been conducted that collected data during actual
airline operations. In 1989, a study was conducted in which communication
rates were compared in three aircraft with increasing levels of automation,
the B737-200, B737-300, and B757 (Costley et al., 1989). It was found that
significantly fewer questions were asked in the highly automated B757
cockpit. Night operations also produced a lower rate of communication
among crews in the B757. (The results were based on total communication as
opposed to communication interactions between the pilots). The researchers
concluded that there is a trend toward lower inter-pilot communication as
the degree of cockpit automation increases (Costley et al., 1989).
Lyall (1992) investigated the effects of mixed-fleet flying on pilot
performance by collecting data during jump-seat observations on the B737-200
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and B737-300. The results indicated that pilots flying mixed trips (flew both
the B737-200 and the more automated B737-300) generally engaged in more
flight-relevant talking between them than did pilots flying pure trips, (flew
only the B737-200 or B737-300 over three days). No significant differences in
flight-relevant talking were found when simply comparing the two aircraft
types (Lyall, 1990).
Wiener (1991) investigated the effects of automation on crew coordination
and communication by comparing the performance of crews flying the DC-9
and the MD-88 aircraft. It was found that the more automated MD-88
imposed greater workload. Wiener theorized (1989) that the roles and
responsibiUties of crew members change when automation is introduced into
the aviation task.
In 1993, a succeeding analysis showed that crew members in the MD-88
aircraft (highly automated) demonstrated significantly more frequent
communications with more questions being asked in the MD-88 (Veinott &
Irwin). Researchers concluded that automatic systems seem to result in a
shift in workload rather than a decrease.
Segal (1993) addressed the connection between automation design and
group dynamics. The data utilized in this study were video and crew
performance measures recorded in 1990 at NASA Ames' Advanced Concept
Flight Simulator. The study found that a reduction in the overall speech
among crew members occurred in the automated cockpit.
Simulator studies have collected data on automation and crew
communication as well. Researchers concluded that it is possible to create
manipulations of automation in low fidelity simulations which possess
sufficient psychological fidelity to allow useful research, if care is taken in
developing the experimental scenario (Bowers, Jentsch, & Salas, 1995).
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A 1992 study which utilized a low-fidelity simulation concluded that
automation appeared to require reallocation of the crew coordination
behaviors (Thornton et al., 1992).
A subsequent study by Bowers extended the investigation of automation
effects to general aviation. He tested subjects with a low-fidelity tabletop
system used to simulate a Cessna 210 aircraft (1995). The communication
between the crew members were analyzed. The results suggested that the
incorporation of the automated system is associated with changes in the
communication patterns initiated by each of the crew-members (Bowers,
1995). Essentially, the nature of communication varies with changes in the
demands of the task.
No studies were found in the literature that addressed the impact of
automation on rotary-wing crew communication.

Statement of the Hypothesis
The research evidence suggests that there may be a change in crew
communication on the automated versus standard flight deck. It is
hypothesized that there will be significant differences between the
communication amount and content of the pilots in the automated and
manual scenarios under varying conditions of workload. More specifically, it
is hypothesized that there will be a significant decrease in communication
amount and content in the automated scenarios. This hypothesis is based
upon consistent findings in the fixed-wing literature which point to an
underlying model of the "need" to communicate being lower in the context
of automation, or perhaps automation masks the "need" to communicate.
This study could support a null hypothesis, in which case, communication
content and amount remained the same in both the automated and manual
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scenarios under varying conditions of workload. This study could support a
second null hypothesis in which communication amount and content
increases in the manual scenario's xmder varying conditions of workload.

METHOD

This study explored the effects of automation on crew communication in
an S-76 low-fidelity desktop simulated helicopter. Two derivatives of the
aircraft were simulated: the automated S-76B helicopter versus the nonautomated S-76B helicopter.

Subjects
Subjects were drawn from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University's
student population and were also sought from helicopter flight schools in the
local and extended Florida area.
Pilots were randomly assigned to two-person crews. A change in crew
occurred if pilots had previously flown together as a crew. All subjects held a
minimum of a current private pilot helicopter rating.
Each of the fourteen crews were composed of a pilot and co-pilot. The pilot
had the responsibility of flying the mission and was given the responsibility
for all final decisions made by the crew. The pilot was in command of the
aircraft. The copilot was responsible for maintaining air traffic control
conununications, copying clearances, accomplished checkUst items and other
tasks as directed by the pilot. The copilot was responsible for programming
the radios, autopilot (if necessary), and instruments. All of this was
accomplished through pointing and clicking on the appropriate instrument
with the mouse, and utilizing a keyboard.
Demographic information was available for all the crews, and is
summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1 Crew member Demographics

AGE (Years)

TOTAL HELICOPTER
FLYING TIME (HOURS)

Mean

42.28

2977.92

SD

11.78

870.00

Min

23.00

95.00

Max

60.00

10000.00

Mean

35.28

794.78

SD

10.60

993.34

Min

23.00

125.00

Max

60.00

4000.00

CREW POSITION
Pilots

Copilots

Out of a total twenty-eight subjects, two were female. Eight out of the
twenty-eight subjects were previously Army heUcopter pilots. Three of the
total subjects were active airline pilots. All but two of the subjects were
instrument rated, and six of the total subjects had Air Transport Pilot ratings.
Only three subjects had experience flying highly automated (EFIS & FMS)
helicopters (Sikorsky 76C+). A total of four subjects had experience flying a
highly automated Level D Helicopter simulator. These simulators included
the S-76C, AH-64, and AH-1. Two of the subjects had previously flown
offshore oil support.

18
Instrument
A low-fidelity desktop simulator was used to simulate a Sikorsky S-76B.
The hardware consisted of one CPU, two computer monitors, three headsets,
a mouse, a cyclic(joystick), collective, and a video camera and recorder. The
monitors were connected to a video splitter, allowing both to run off the
same CPU. The joystick was used as the cyclic, and a collective was integrated.
This particular collective was obtained from FlightLink and was compatible
with the software. A partitioner to divide the pilot and copilot was installed
in between subjects. The purpose for the partitioner was "to create
interdependence in the two-person crews" (Bowers, Salas, Prince & Brannick,
1992). Essentially, the task is divided so that each crew member has specific
responsibilities as well as overlapping functions (Bowers et al., 1992). The
pilot flew the simulated program and made input to the computer with a
joystick acting as the cyclic and a collective that was mounted to the floor.
The copilot made input to the simulated program via a keyboard and mouse.
ResponsibiUties of the copilot included changing frequencies and instrument
settings, screen views, as well as the setting of the autopilot.
The instrument set up for this research was based upon a low-fideUty
paradigm used to study teams outUned by Bowers, Salas, Prince, and Brannick
(1992). This model is outlined in Figure 2.
The simulation software that was used for this research was X-Plane/XRotor by Laminar Research. This software was chosen because of if s
heUcopter cockpit software and aUowed the experimenter to alter the cockpit
from manual to automated and manipulate weather changes.
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Monitor 2

Monitor 1

D

COPILOT STATION

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

dF-d

B.

PILOT STATION

Video splitter
Audio mixer
Camcorder
Keyboard
Joystick/cyclic
Headsets
Collective
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the low-fidelity
simulation research paradigm.
(from Bowers, Salas, Prince & Brannick, 1992).

20
Design
The design and procedure for this study will parallel the procedures
conducted by Bowers in 1995, while conducting a study entitled "Impact of
Automation on Air crew Communication and Decision-Making
Performance." In that study pilots were assigned to two-person crews and
asked to fly a simulated mission in either automated (autopilot engaged) or
manual conditions using a low-fidelity desktop simulator.
In this study seven crews were assigned to the automated condition in
which they were instructed to fly as much of the scenario as possible with the
simulator's autopilot engaged. The autopilot consists of directional GPS
integration, altitude and vertical speed hold. Seven crews were also assigned
to the manual condition in which they were instructed not to use the
autopilot function.

Experimental Scenario
Each crew flew a scenario designed specifically for this research project. The
scenario was one which began as a VFR flight and degraded into a high
workload IFR flight. All subjects received the same script for the experiment.
Each crew was instructed that their mission involved flying from a
departure airport (Daytona Beach -DAB) to land at a second airport(MCOOrlando Executive).

When subjects stated that they were ready to begin, they

were given a clearance. The study began at that point.
The scenario involved a period of increased workload while enroute. The
scenario started as a marginal VFR approach which degraded into an IFR
approach as crews approached their destination airport. Weather was preprogrammed before the experiment to meet VFR conditions with weather
slowly deteriorating into the flight.
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The scenario began when the crew encountered a deteriorating weather
condition along the route. Crews were informed of this initially through a
call to listen to the ATIS in which they heard the following: "Executive
Information Juliet, 1 Hundred Zooloo Weather, Measured Ceiling 2300
overcast, visibility 3, temperature 59, dewpoint 54, Winds 360 at 32, arriving
and departing runway 25, advise on initial contact you have Juliet." The
weather conditions up to this point had been very good. The ATIS call is the
first step in a deteriorating weather condition. At this point, crews must
decided weather to continue on, change their approach, return to departure
airport, or decide if other actions are needed. The second step in the
deteriorating weather condition is revealed to the crew after they contact
Orlando approach in which they are told: "Sikorsky 8375Tango, weather
deteriorating in approach area, wind 050 at 32, runway 7 in use, contact tower
on 118.7." At this point, the crew must decide whether it is safe to continue
flying and what other actions are required by them. The change in weather
conditions requires the crews to utilize Instrument Flight Rules. And the
high winds are a significant factor that act to deter the crew and provide
significant information for them to consider as a helicopter crew. Crews
must also decide at this point whether to check weather at alternate airports.
Fuel remaining also becomes a more significant factor at this point in the
scenario. The third step in the degradation of the weather is the call from the
Airport Tower informing crew that "8375Tango, Orlando Executive closed
due to convective weather and windshear in the area, proceed to alternate
airport." This is a high workload task requiring crews to locate alternate
airport(s), tune the VOR, locate frequencies, re-program autopilot, check
maps/approaches, etc... Crews must also decide whether to communicate to
the air traffic control agency.
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Each of the crews communicated information orally during scenarios. It is
important to note that the actual videotape segments varied in length because
of the choices and different ways in which crews performed the flight. These
differences in the duration of videotapes required that a twenty-five minute
"chunk" be taken from each scenario for analyses.

Procedures
Before the scenario, subjects completed a background/demographic
information form. Subjects were randomly assigned to the position of Pilot
or Copilot-pilot and were allowed to perform practice scenarios that involved
familiarizing themselves with the simulator.

Crews were randomly assigned

to flight condition (manual or automated). Subjects assigned to the
automated scenario were given training on the use of the autopilot and were
instructed to use the autopilot as much as possible during the experiments.
Subjects in the manual scenario were instructed not to use the autopilot
feature. After the practice scenario, subjects were given a short scenario to fly
in which they were required to meet a standard baseline of performance.
After training criteria were met, subjects were given a short break. Upon
their return, subjects were given time to flight plan and conduct a "pretakeoff
briefing" before the experiment began. All the charts, sectionals, and approach
plates that subjects needed were supplied for them. Subjects were instructed
to inform the experimenter when the pretakeoff briefing was complete.
When subjects were ready, they were given a clearance and the experiment
began at that time. After the experiment subjects were debriefed by the
experimenter.

Training Criteria
Initially subjects were allowed to "play" around with the simulator to
familiarize themselves with it as well as to adjust the seat height to match
their body position comfortably with the collective and cyclic. Subjects were
given training and instruction on the desktop simulator and software. After
the training, subjects were instructed to fly a short twenty-minute scenario in
which they were required to meet certain training standards such as holding
heading plus/minus 10 degrees, holding altitude plus /minus lOOfeet. The
training criteria for the copilot consisted of demonstrating knowledge of how
to operate the radios: Coml and Nav2 and autopilot. The co-pilot was also
required to meet the criteria of using the keyboard for certain functions such
as changing the view if the Pilot Flying commanded him/her to do so:
"forward 30 degrees", "downward 50 degrees", "backward view", etc... For
example, to change screen downward 50 degrees, keyboard function F5
accomplished this. These training criteria was set forth to insure steady state
performance from subjects as opposed to being somewhere on the learning
curve.

Data Collection
The scenarios were monitored. Audio and video tape provided the
primary means of data capture by recording all verbal transactions that
occured between crew members.

Communication Coding and Coder Training
Communication content was coded by three trained raters. Raters received
training designed to familiarize them with the categories and to facilitate

reliability. The coder training was based on the technique utilized by Bowers,
Deaton, Oser, Prince, & Kolb (1995).

Coder training included:
•

a brief overview of the project

•

an overview of the coding form

• an overview of the two scenarios
•

an explanation of the definitions and examples of the nine target
behaviors (SEE TABLE 2)

• practice coding sessions
• a discussion on how to handle the ambiguous communications.
Communication Categories
Communication content of the participants were coded using a ninecategory coding system, and was adapted from (Oser et al, 1991). SEE TABLE 2.
The categories were based on the findings of previous aircrew
communication literature (Oser et al, 1991). The categories were: commands,
observations, suggestions, statements of intent, inquiries, acknowledgments,
replies, non-task related, and uncodable communications.
Commands - Commands are specific assignment(s) of responsibility by one
group member to another (Foushee & Helmreich, 1988). Although the pilot
or co-pilot can issue commands, it is typically the pilot in command of the
aircraft that initiates commands. "Commands serve as a means to
communicate information related to the division of labor and delegation of
duties" (Oser, et al. 1991). Commands are also used to communicate
information about the specific task to be accomplished, its timing, and
relative priority compared to other tasks (Jensen, 1986). Foushee et al. (1986)
points out that commands appear to have a coordinating effect on crew

performance because of their strong influence on subordinate crewmember
actions.
Observations - Observations are remarks made by crewmembers aimed at
orienting others to some aspect of flight status such as references to
instruments or navigation (Foushee & Manos, 1981). This type of
verbalization provides information about what a crewmember has seen,
heard, perceived and is characteristic of their awareness of some aspect of
flight status. Oser et. al. (1991) note that crewmembers often communicate
what is taking place internal and external to the aircraft and that the
observations verbalized provide input for the crewmembers to act upon.
Suggestions - Suggestions are recommendations for a specific course of
action (Foushee, Lauber, Baetge, & Acomb, 1986) or the introduction of an
idea for consideration from one crewmember to another (Jensen, 1986).
Suggestions involve a recommendation or an idea put forth by one
crewmember to the other about a flight topic (Oser, et al., 1991).
Statements of Intent

Statements of intent are announcements of intended

actions, present or future, by the speaker (Foushee et al., 1986). These types of
communication occur prior to the crew performing a duty and include tasks
or specific actions such as navigational, tactical or procedural (Oser et al.,
1991). Statements of intent keep other crewmembers informed about actions
that either the speaker or crew is about to undertake (Jensen, 1986). Foushee
et al. (1986) suggested that statements of intent reflect the amount of overall
coordination between crewmembers.
Inquiries Inquiries are requests for information in regards to some aspect
of flight status (Foushee & Manos, 1981) or for assistance on a particular task
(Jensen, 1986). Communication of these type are information seeking
behaviors designed to elicit assistance from others and are generally in the
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form of a question (Oser et al., 1991). Inquiries are used by crewmembers to
formally request inputs from each other and obtain needed information
about a task (Oser et al., 1991).
Acknowledgments - Acknowledgments are recognitions of a given
communication (Foushee & Manos, 1981). They provide an indication that a
prior speech act was heard, but do not supply any additional information or
evaluative response (Foushee et al., 1986). Typical acknowledgments are
"yeah," "okay," or "roger." These types of communication are important
because they are informative in nature and let the other crewmember know
that his/her communication was received. Acknowledgments tend to
reinforce the interaction process (Foushee et al. 1986).
Replies - Replies are statements used to respond to an inquiry, suggestion,
or other communication that involves more information than a simple
acknowledgment (Kanki et al., 1987). Replies provide more information than
a simple acknowledgment.

Also, replies may provide an indication to the

sender of a message that information has been properly understood or
accurately received (Oser et al., 1991).
Non-task related These types of communication are unrelated to the
flight task at hand. These behaviors include all socio-emotional
communications exhibited between crewmembers (Oser et al., 1991). Nontask related communications include incidents of embarrassment, tension
release, humor, frustration, etc. (Oser et al., 1991). Non-task related
communications accounted for a very small percentage of the total
communications in this investigation.
Uncodable

"These communications include interactions that can not be

classified, either because no accurate category exists or because they are
unintelligible" (Oser et al., 1991). Less than 6.9% of all the communications in

this study were uncodable. Uncodable communications result from a
crewmember mumbling or malfunctioning radio equipment or two
crewmembers trying to talk at the same time. Oser et al. (1991) notes that the
presence of uncodable communication may be suggestive of difficulties that
exist in the interaction process between crewmembers.
Each of these categories was analyzed separately. The commimication
content results were used as dependent variables to explore how the content
of communication was affected by crewmember position and type of flight:
manual or autopilot.

TABLE 2
COMMUNICATION CATEGORIES, DEFINITIONS, AND EXAMPLES
(Bowers, Deaton, Oser, Prince, & Kolb, 1995)
Category
Commands (CMD)
Observations (OBS)

Suggestions (SUG)

Statements of Intent
(SOI)
Inquiries (INQ)
Acknowledgments
(ACK)

Replies (REP)

Nontask related (NTR)
Uncodable (UNC)

Definition

Examples

Specific assignments of
responsibility by one group
member to another.
Remarks made by
crewmembers aimed at
orienting others to some
aspect of flight status, such as
references to instruments,
environment or navigation.
Recommendations for a
specific course of action or the
introduction of an idea for
consideration from one
crewmember to another.
Announcements of intended
actions, present or future, by
the speaker.
Requests for information
regarding some aspect of
flight status.
Statements that are u sed to
reply to an inquiry,
observation, or other
communication that only
indicates that a
communication was received.
Statements used to respond to
an inquiry, suggestion, or
other communication that
involves more information
than a simple
acknowledgment.
Any speech acts referring to
something other than the
present task.
Any speech acts that are
unintelligible or
unclassifiable with respect to
the present coding scheme.

"I need timing there please"
"You need to come a little bit
to the right here."
"Altitude looks good."
"And I got you at about 100
feet prior."
"We're starting to go in and
out of the clouds here."
"I don't think this is gonna
get us there
"
"And you might want to let
ATC know that we're
heading back."
"Okay, I'm coming right."
"I'm gonna change us to
operations."
"What supply are we picking
up next?"
"When do we call?"
"You say 13?" (OBS)
"Roger." (ACK)
"Lewis is next?" (INQ)
"Yeah" (ACK)

"What's our ETA?" (INQ)
"11:47:34" (REP)
"Slow down your airspeed."
(CMD)
"Slowing down to 80knots."
(REP)
"I'm not comfortable here."
"Good call Joe, you read my
mind."
". . . righf
'The cards there."

ANALYSIS

Video tapes were randomized when played back for analysis coding so as to
conceal the flight condition (automated or manual) to the raters. The
transcripts were categorized using a nine category coding system adapted from
Oser et al. (1991). The communication content of the subjects' speech were
transcribed onto coding forms. Raters were given the task of categorizing
speech acts into one of nine categories: commands, observations, suggestions,
statements of intent, inquiries, acknowledgments, replies, non-task related,
and uncodable communications. The data from the coding sessions indicated
that raters could perform this task with acceptable levels of agreement (the
average inter-rater r was .84).
The hypotheses of how crew communication content is affected by pilot
position and automation level was examined using a Multivariate Analyses
of Variance (MANOVA). A MANOVA was selected because multiple
dependent variables (i.e., nine communication content categories) were
assessed. Advantages to using MANOVA instead of multiple one or two-way
variance (ANOVA) is that MANOVA can reveal differences not shown in a
series of individual ANOVAs and MANOVA can provide increased
protection against Type-1 errors (Oser, et al. 1991).
The MANOVA focused on assessing changes in the frequency of the
communication content measures (i.e., dependent variables) as a function of
crew member position (i.e., pilot, copilot) and flight level (i.e.,manual,
automated).
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Results
The results of this research are discussed in two sections. The first section
provides the results of descriptive analyses (i.e., totals, means, standard
deviations) performed for the communication patterns. The descriptive
analyses provide a preliminary examination of the general nature of
heUcopter crew communication.
The second section of the results investigates how communication content
is affected by pilot position (pilot vs. copilot) and flight requirement (manual
vs. automated). These results emphasize the relationship between
communication and automation level. The results of this analysis identify
specific types of communication content that are associated with the flight
type: manual or automated.

Descriptive Analyses
Frequency-based Communication Content
Using the nine category classification system, a total of 3012 transcript lines
were coded for the fourteen crews (mean=253 lines /crew). The means and
standard deviations for the frequencies of communication content during
manual and automated flight scenarios are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
Preliminary analyses indicated that a higher frequency of total
communications was demonstrated during manual flights (1771 lines in
manual vs. 1241 in automated). The mean frequency of communications
during the manual and automated flights were 126.5 (manual) and 88.6
(automated).
Observations were the most frequently coded communications initiated by
both crew members during manual and automated flights. Observations
accoimted for 24.4% of the total communications during manual flights and
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26.5% of the total communications during automated flights. In comparison,
the initiation of suggestions were the least frequently coded type of
communication during the manual flights, accounting for only 5.4% of the
total communications in manual flights. The initiation of non-task related
communications were the least frequently coded type of communication
during the automated flights, accounting for only 1.4% of the total
communications, respectively.

Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations (SD) For Frequencies of Communication
Content By Crew members During Manual Flight.
Pilots
Freq.
Mean
SD
CPs
Freq.
Mean
SD
Crew
Freq.
Mean
SD

CMD OBS
SUG
232
185
50
31.71 26.42
6.71
13.32
8.81
2.43

SOI
63
9.00
3.74

ACK REP
INQ
109
61
95
8.71
13.57 15.57
7.76
4.02
5.62

NTR UNC
125
5
15.28 .7143
9.48
1.49

21
3.00
1.63

248
35.42
9.64

47
6.71
2.28

84
12.57
3.40

90
12.85
2.26

192
27.42
5.79

99
14.14
3.48

56
7.85
2.96

9
1.28
1.79

253
17.35
17.46

433
30.92
10.02

97
6.71
2.26

147
10.78
3.90

185
13.21
4.13

301
21.50
9.01

160
11.42
4.58

181
11.57
7.77

14
1.00
1.61

Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations (SD) For Frequencies of Communication
Content By Crew members During Automated Flights.
Pilots
Freq.
Mean
SD
CPs
Freq.
Mean
SD
Crew
Freq.
Mean
SD

CMD
171
24.42
7.63

OBS
179
25.57
9.67

SUG
55
7.85
3.07

SOI
82
11.71
3.54

INQ
59
8.42
4.11

ACK
72
10.28
4.30

REP
59
8.42
1.90

NTR
12
1.71
.9512

3
.4286
.5345

150
21.42
4.07

22
3.14
2.67

59
8.42
2.07

59
8.42
2.99

135
19.28
7.15

114
6
16.28 " .8571
2.05
.8997

2
.2857
.4880

174
12.42
13.49

329
23.5
7.44

77
5.50
3.69

141
10.07
3.26

118
8.42
3.45

207
14.78
7.35

173
12.35
4.49

4
.2857
.4688

18
1.28
.9945

Note. CMD=Commands; OBS=Observations; SUG=Suggestions;
SOI=Statements of Intent; INQ=Inquiries; ACK=Acknowledgments;
REP=Replies; NTR=Non-task related; UNC=Uncodable.

UNC
2
.2857
.4880

Frequency-Based Communication Analyses
This section of the results focuses on identifying the effects of crew
member position and automation level on communication amount and
content. A Multivariate Analyses of Variance (MANOVA) was performed to
analyze the frequency data for each of the nine content categories.
Multivariate tests yielded a significant effect among the nine categories, in
terms of both main effects and their interaction. Through the use of Wilks'
Lambda criterion for the data analysis, the content categories were found to be
significantly affected by crew position [F (9,16) = 19.178, p<.05], automation
level [F, 9,16) = 9.842, p<.05], and their interaction [F (9,16) = 3.037, p,.05].
Based on the significant results of the MANOVA, a series of univariate
ANOVAs was performed to identify the specific dependent variables (i.e.,
communication content categories) that were affected by the independent
variables (i.e., crew position, automation level) or their interaction. The
results of the univariate ANOVAs are presented in Table 4.
The univariate ANOVAs yielded significant main effects for the crew
member position variable on five of the communication content categories
(i.e., commands, suggestions, acknowledgments, replies, non-task related) and
for the automation level variable on four of the communication content
categories (i.e., observations, inquiries, acknowledgments, non-task related).
In addition, three position-by-automation level interactions were found to
be significant (i.e., observations, suggestions, statements of intent).
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Commands
The main effect for automation was not significant, nor was the interaction
of pilot position X automation level. However, the main effect for pilot
position was significant, F (1,27), = 81.452, p<.05. The mean command
response rate for the pilots was 28.07, whereas the mean for the copilots was
1.71. Figure 3 illustrates the main effect for pilot position on command
responses.
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Observations
The main effect for automation was significant, F (1,27) = 5.50, p<.05. The
mean for the manual condition was 30.92, whereas the mean for the
automated condition was 23.50.
Observation responses were produced .2444 (or 24.4%) of the time in the
manual mode and .3083 (or 30.8%) of the time in the automated mode.
The Pilot Position X Level of Automation interaction was significant,
F (1, 27) = 4.306, p<.05. Figure 4 shows the Observation response rate as
function of pilot position and level of automation. Essentially, figure 4
displays that the mean for pilots in the manual condition was 26.42, whereas
the mean Observations for pilots in the automated condition was 25.57. The
mean Observations for copilots in the manual condition was 35.42, as
compared to a mean of 21.42 for copilots in the automated condition.
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Figure 4. Observation rate as a function
of pilot position and automation level.

Suggestions
The main effect for automation was not significant. However, the main
effect for pilot position was significant, F (1,27) = 5.604, p<.05. The mean
suggestion response rate for pilots was 7.28 as compared to a mean of 4.92 for
copilots.
The interaction of Pilot Position X Automation level was significant,
F, (1,27) = 5.604, p<.05. The mean number of Suggestions for the pilots in the
manual condition was 6.71 and the mean for the automated condition was
7.85. In addition, the mean number of Suggestions for copilots in the manual
condition was 6.71 with a decrease to a mean of 3.14 in the automated
condition. Suggestion response rate as a function of pilot position and level
of automation is displayed in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Suggestion response rate as a
function of pilot position and automation
level.

Statements of Intent
The main effect for automation was not significant, nor was the main
effect for pilot position. The interaction of Pilot Position X Level of
Automation was significant, F (1,27) = 7.749, p<.05. Figure 6 shows the
"Statements of Intent" response rate as a function of pilot position and level
of automation. The mean number of "Statements of Intent" issued by pilots
in the manual condition was 9.00 as compared to 11.71 mean statements of
intent issued by pilots in the automated condition. The mean number of
Statements of Intent issued by copilots in the manual condition was 12.57 and
8.42 in the automated condition.
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Figure 6. Statements of Intent as a
f u n c t i o n of pilot position and a u t o m a t i o n
level.

Inquiries
The main effect for automation was significant, F (1,27) = 10.233, p<.05.
The mean for the manual condition was 13.2143, whereas the mean for the
automated condition was 8.4286. Figure 7 illustrates the main effect for
automation. The main effect for pilot position was not significant, nor was
the interaction of pilot position by automation level.
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Acknowledgments
The main effect for automation was significant, F (1,27) = 7.710, p<.05. The
mean for the manual condition was 21.50, as compared to the mean for the
automated condition which was 14.78.
In addition, the main effect for pilot position was significant,
F (1,27) = 18.600, p<.05. The mean for the Pilots in the manual condition was
15.57, whereas the mean for the pilots in the automated condition were 10.28.
The mean for the Copilots in the manual condition were 27.42, whereas the
mean for the Copilots in the automated condition were 19.28. The interaction
of pilot position and level of automation was not significant. Figure 8
illustrates these main effects.
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Replies
The main effect for automation was not significant, nor was the Interaction
between Pilot Position and Level of Automation. Yet, the main effect for
pilot position was significant, F(l,27) = 34.09, p<.05. The mean reply response
rate for pilots in the manual condition were 8.71, as compared to a mean reply
response rate of 8.42 in the automated condition. The mean reply response
rate for the copilots in the manual condition was 14.14, whereas the mean for
the copilots in the automated condition was 16.28. Figure 9 illustrates the
percentage of the response "replies" for pilot position and automation level.
For example, in the manual condition, 6.5% of pilots' total speech acts were
replies as compared to 8.5% in the automated condition. For copilots, 11.7%
of their total speech acts consisted of replies, as compared to 20% in the
automated condition.
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Non-task related
The main effect for automation level was significant, F (1,27) = 29.49, p<.05.
The mean number of non-task related speech acts was 11.57 in the manual
condition, versus a mean response rate of 1.28 in the automated condition.
The main effect for pilot position was also significant, F (1,27) = 4.783,
p<.05. The mean number of non-task related responses for the pilots flying in
the manual condition was 15.28, as compared to a mean of 1.71 in the
automated condition. Also, the mean number of non-task related responses
for the copilots-pilots in the manual condition was 7.85, as compared to a
mean of .85 in the automated condition. Figure 10 illustrates the mean
number of non-task related responses as a function of pilot position and
automation level.
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None of the effects were significant.

level

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this investigation was to clarify the relationship between
cockpit automation and helicopter crew communication. This study was
designed based on previous research carried out with fixed-wing crews, but it
was restructured to address helicopter crew issues. The conclusions that are
presented here thus refer to the helicopter environment. However, some
conclusions do parallel situations already recognized by research in this area
with fixed-wing crews, therefore highlighting that some effects of automation
are not unique to a specific flight platform.
Overall, crews in the automated condition exhibited far less
communication behaviors than crews in the manual conditions. The results
suggest that the introduction of automation reduces the amount of cockpit
crew communication used by crews. Another explanation for the decrease in
overall communication in the automated conditions is that the automation
"masks" the need to communicate.

Automation Level, Pilot Position Interactions
Observations
The primary task of the pilot was to provide control inputs to the
simulator to sustain the flight requirement. In the automated scenario, this
task was changed to a monitoring of the controls and system. The results of
the analyses showed that pilots exhibited higher rates of Observations in the
manual conditions than did pilots in the automated conditions. This finding

is somewhat surprising as the removal of the physical task of flying would
increase the need for pilots to provide observations during automated
conditions. The only explanation for the increased rates of observations on
the part of the pilots in the manual must be due to other task requirements.
A likely explanation is that although the copilot has taken over the task
requirement of flying (essentially by programming and having control over
the autopilot), the shift in workload has not occurred in a mutual way. That
is, the pilot has not taken over the traditional monitoring and observing role
in the automated scenario from the copilot. The pilot is still concerned with
other tasks in the automated condition and does not willingly move into an
observer role, or realize that his/her copilot is making fewer observations.
The results of the analyses also indicated that pilots exhibited higher rates
of Observations during automated conditions than did their copilots in the
automated conditions indicating the shift in roles with the copilot becoming
more active with the programming of the autopilot in flight and therefore
less time to devote to observation. The introduction of automation changed
the copilots role to that of a programmer of the autopilot. Essentially, it
appears the copilots using an automated cockpit had less time to monitor and
scan for traffic, with more "heads down" time with the programming of the
autopilot (this is expressed in the decreased number of observations in the
automated condition).
The results also show that copilots exhibited higher rates of Observations
in the manual conditions than copilots in the automated conditions. This is
not surprising as the task of the copilots in the manual is one of an observer
of flight status (as the pilot does most of the work in the physical task of
flying). Again, it appears from the results that the copilot role changed from
one of a observer in the manual condition to one of a programmer in the

automated condition. Hence, the copilots' communication is indicative of
the switch in roles. These results validate Wiener's theory (1989) that the
roles and responsibilities of the crew members change when automation is
introduced into an aviation task.

Suggestions
The results of the analyses indicated that pilots exhibited a higher rate of
suggestions as compared to copilots during automated conditions. These
results suggest that the incorporation of automation into the system relieves
the pilot of the task of flying, thereby freeing up his/her resources and
allowing more attention to be focused on decision-making and future courses
of action(as indicated by the increased number of suggestions in the
automated conditions).
The role of the copilot as a "communicator of suggestions" was greater in
the manual conditions as compared to copilots in the automated conditions.
This indicates the shift in workload. Essentially, the copilots' workload
became higher in the automated conditions as he/she had the responsibility
of programming the autopilot in addition to traditional responsibilities. It
appears that the copilot has less resources to lend to the decision-making task,
as indicated by the decrease in suggestions under automation.
Again, these results validate Wiener's (1989) hypothesis that roles and
responsibilities of crew members change when automation is introduced into
the aviation task. In essence, the nature of communication varies with
changes in the demands of the task itself.
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Statements of Intent
The results of the analyses indicated that pilots initiated higher rates of
statements of intent in the automated condition than did pilots in the
manual condition. This finding is somewhat surprising because the need for
pilots to make control inputs and therefore the need to inform their copilots
of their intended actions should be reduced with the introduction of the
automated system. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the increased rate of
statements of intent initiated by pilots in the automated conditions must be
due to other task requirements. One likely explanation is that the pilots in
the automated flight were stating more of their intended actions (going over
their approaches, what they will do, etc..) to keep themselves in the loop of
flying and their copilots informed. This could be observed in the videotapes
of the automated conditions where the pilots exhibited almost a "nervous
chatter" of intended actions as a result of the hands off (which is unusual for
helo. pilots), autopilot flying. Their role became more of a manager and
planner as a result of the removal of the physical task of flying. The increased
statements of intent in the automated conditions were composed of more
future intended actions rather than present actions initiated. For example, in
one crew, the pilot began to review his intended approach with his copilot
once the autopilot was engaged. Several communications were initiated
between the crew, most of which were composed of statement of intent by the
pilot such as: "We'll do the 18right, and our decision height will be 540
feet...upon station passage we'll do a right turn, etc..."

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
The results of the analyses indicated that the roles (as indicated by the rates
of observations, suggestions and statements of intent) for each of the crew
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members were different as a function of whether the crew was performing in
the automated or manual conditions. The roles shift as a function of the task
demand (Bowers et. al., 1995). Overall, pilots exhibited far less
communication in the automated conditions. However, the pilots role as a
communicator of observations, suggestions and statements of intent was
greater in the automated conditions than the manual. The results suggest
that the incorporation of automation is associated with changes in the
communication amount and content initiated by each of the crew members.
In other words, the verbalization demands placed on pilots and copilots differ
as a result of automation.
In summary, the above results have led the researcher to accept the initial
hypothesis and conclude that, within the helicopter environment, crew
communication and therefore, crew coordination is influenced by
automation under varying conditions of workload.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This investigation provided an initial understanding of how automation
influences the unique communication patterns and characteristics of
heUcopter pilots. Based on the findings, the following recommendations are
proposed:
1. A low-fideUty research paradigm was utilized for this study. Therefore, the
first recommendation is to study the effects of automation in a full-motion
simulator, with a LOFT type scenario to obtain a more reaUstic, high fideUty
environment.
2. Only one experimental scenario was utilized in this study. It would be
beneficial to repeat this study design with different scenarios. For example,
the ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System) frequently cited incidents that
occurred in congested cities. It would be beneficial to understand how
different terrain's affect the use of automation. To illustrate, many of the
former Army heUcopter pilots in this study considered automation a benefit
to long-range missions such as offshore oil support and Coast Guard
operations, and a hazard to other types of heUcopter flying, such as in
congested cities or short flights.
3. This study made no distinction between military and civilian trained
heUcopter pilots. MiUtary pilots receive some form of ACT (Aircrew
Coordination Training) and were very cognizant of crew coordination in this
study, whereas most of the civiUan helicopter pilots had Uttle or no CRM
training. Although this aUowed for a good representative sample of

commercial heUcopter pilots flying today, it would be beneficial to study the
effects of automation on crew coordination in a miUtary setting as weU as in
the commercial (civilian) heUcopter market. Essentially, the use of
automated systems is driven by mission requirements in the miUtary. It
would be beneficial to understand the result of this technology on crew
coordination with the goal of implementing the findings into Aircrew
Coordination Training for crews flying highly advanced heUcopters.
4. To the researcher's knowledge, automation effects on crew coordination
are not taken into account in Helicopter CRM (Crew Resource Management)
training programs. This might caU for a unique program or an addition to
CRM programs to address this issue.
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APPENDIX A. DEMOGRAPHIC SHEET
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HELICOPTERSTUDY
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS ARE A PRIVATE PILOT - HELICOPTER
LICENSE.
1. Helicopter pilot Certificates and Experience:
private
ATP

commercial

instrument

instructor

other (please explain):
Flight Time Total:
Last 90 days:
2. Were you trained as a helicopter pilot in the military?
If yes, what helicopter(s) are you certified in?

no

yes

3. Do you have any experience flying a highly automated
helicopter(s)? (automated = EFIS and FMS)
no
yes
(If yes, please elaborate on type of helicopter and automated systems):

EXPERIMENT WILL CONSIST OF FLYING A SIMULATED HELICOPTER
SCENARIO IN A TWO-PERSON CREW. A DESKTOP SIMULATOR WILL
BE USED TO SIMULATE A SIKORSKY S-76B HELICOPTER. THE
EXPERIMENT SHOULD TAKE APPROXIMATELY 1 HOUR TO COMPLETE.
Name (Print):
Phone:
E-mail:
Primary language:
Date of Birth:

APPENDIX B. CREW CONCEPT BRIEFING-PILOT
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CREW CONCEPT BRIEFING
PILOT

You have been randomly assigned to the position of PILOT.
Responsibilities include making control inputs into the simulator with
respect to the course and altitude, airspeed, etc... For the purposes of this
study this also means that you are the PIC. Pilot in Command is responsible
for the conduct and safety of the flight. PIC designates pilot flying and copilot
duties.

APPENDIX C. CREW CONCEPT BRIEFING- COPILOT
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CREW CONCEPT BRIEFING
COPILOT

You have been randomly assigned to the position of COPILOT.
Copilot maintains ATC communications, copies clearances, accomplishes
checklists and other tasks as directed by the Pilot (PIC).
Through the use of a keyboard and mouse, the instruments, radio settings,
and autopilot functions can be manipulated.

APPENDIX D. ASSIGNED MISSION SHEET FOR MANUAL CONDITION
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ASSIGNED MISSION

YOUR MISSION IS TO FLY FROM DAYTONA BEACH AIRPORT (DAB) TO
ORLANDO EXECUTIVE AIRPORT (ORL).
Do not use the Autopilot function to fly the scenario.

Your alternate landing airports are:
Orlando Sanford (SFB)

All the charts, sectionals, and approach plates that you need will be supplied
for you.
You will now have fifteen minutes (or more if needed) to conduct a preflight
briefing as a crew:
-review departure procedures (route and altitude)
-review required callouts
-ask your crewmember if there are any questions.

PLEASE INFORM THE EXPERIMENTER WHEN YOU ARE FINISHED WITH
THE PREFLIGHT BRIEFING.

APPENDLX E. ASSIGNED MISSION SHEET FOR AUTOMATED
CONDITION
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ASSIGNED MISSION

YOUR MISSION IS TO FLY FROM DAYTONA BEACH AIRPORT (DAB) TO
ORLANDO EXECUTIVE AIRPORT (ORL).
Fly as much of the scenario as possible with the simulators Autopilot
engaged.

Your alternate landing airports are:
Orlando Sanford (SFB)

All the charts, sectionals, and approach plates that you need will be supplied
for you.
You will now have fifteen minutes (or more if needed) to conduct a preflight
briefing as a crew:
-review departure procedures (route and altitude)
-review required callouts
-ask your crewmember if there are any questions.

PLEASE INFORM THE EXPERIMENTER WHEN YOU ARE FINISHED WITH
THE PREFLIGHT BRIEFING.

APPENDIX F. MANUAL DEPARTURE CHECKLIST
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DEPARTURE CHECKLIST
Pilot flying calls for checklist items and copilot "reads back" item as action
is completed. Pilot flying must complete departure checklist.
1. SEAT
2. FUEL
3. TRIM
4. ATIS (120.5)
5. ALTIMETER
6. CLEARANCE (119.3)
7. NAVs
8. HEADING AND COURSE BUG
9. DME
10. TRANSPONDER
11. DEPARTURE BRIEFING
12. COM TO TWR. (120.7)
13. REQUEST TAKEOFF
(Begin flight by clicking yellow "paused" button.)

ADJUST (Both)
CHECK (Copilot)
CENTERED (Pilot)
COPIED (Copilot)
SET (Copilot)
RECEIVED (Copilot)
SET (Copilot)
SET (Copilot)
SET (Copilot)
SET (Copilot)
COMPLETE (Pilot)
SET (Copilot)
COMPLETE (Copilot)

APPENDIX G. AUTOMATED DEPARTURE CHECKLIST
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DEPARTURE CHECKLIST
Pilot flying calls for checklist items and copilot "reads back" item as action
is completed. Pilot flying must complete departure checklist.
1. SEAT
2. FUEL
3. TRIM
4. ATIS (120.5)
5. ALTIMETER
6. CLEARANCE (119.3)
7. NAVs
8. HEADING AND COURSE BUG
9. DME
10. TRANSPONDER
11. DEPARTURE BRIEFING
12. COM TO TWR. (120.7)
13. REQUEST TAKEOFF
14. PROGRAM AUTOPILOT

ADJUST (Both)
CHECK (Copilot)
CENTERED (Pilot)
COPIED (Copilot)
SET (Copilot)
RECEIVED (Copilot)
SET (Copilot)
SET (Copilot)
SET (Copilot)
SET (Copilot)
COMPLETE (Pilot)
SET (Copilot)
COMPLETE (Copilot)
CHECK (Copilot)

(Begin flight by clicking yellow "paused" button.)

APPENDIX H. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SCRIPT
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ATC SCRIPT
ATC calls are listed in order of first, second, etc...
1. ATIS DAYTONA (120.05) : "Daytona Beach International -InformationXRay
Zero Hundred Zooloo Weather. Sky clear, visibility 5, Temp. 59, Dewpoint 0.
Wind 050 at 6. Altimeter 29.92. Arriving and departing runway 7 left.
Advise on initial contact you have X-ray/7
2. ATC CLEARANCE OUT OF DAYTONA: "8375Tango you are cleared as
filed, maintain at or below 1500 initially, expect higher after that. Departure
will be on 123.9. Squawk 4244. Advise when ready to takeoff/'
3. TAKEOFF CLEARANCE: "8375Tango cleared for takeoff runway 7 left/'
4. ONE MINUTE AFTER DEPARTURE: "8375Tango contact departure on
123.9."
5. DEPARTURE: "8375Tango, Radar Contact, climb to 2000 approved, proceed
on course to Orlando Executive."
6. ON COURSE, SEVEN MINUTES INTO SCENARIO: "8375Tango turn left
20 degrees for traffic avoidance."
7. ON COURSE, TWELVE MINUTES INTO SCENARIO: "8375Tango, Proceed
on course."
8. ORLANDO EXECUTIVE ATIS (127.25) : "Executive Information Juliet. 1
Hundred Zooloo weather, Measured ceiling 2300 overcast. Visibility 3.
Temperature 59.
Dewpoint 54. Wind 360 at 32. Arriving and Departing runway 25. Advise on
initial contact you have Juliet."
9. APPROACH CALL(124.8) : "8375Tango weather deteriorating in approach
area, wind 050 at 32, runway 7 in use, contact tower on 118.7."
10. TOWER CALL (118.7): "8375Tango, Orlando Executive closed due to
connective weather and windshear in the area, proceed to alternate airport."
11. ATIS FOR SANFORD ALTERNATE: "Orlando Sanford, Information
November. Measured ceiling 3000, visibility 4 miles, temp. 59, dewpoint 56,
wind 350 at 15. Altimeter 29.92. Arriving and departing runway 9 left. Advise
on initial contact you have November."

APPENDLX I. KEY COMMAND INSTRUCTIONS FOR COPILOT IN
MANUAL CONDITION

KEY COMMAND INSTRUCTIONS - COPILOT/MANUAL
Operating the system can be accomplised in two ways: (1) By pointing and
clicking with the mouse, or (2) Using the keyboard command equivalents
listed below:
(By depressing the key function on the left, the instrument on the right is
manipulated). For example, press the "y" key and the heading bug turns left.
Press the "u" key and the heading bug turns right.
y u Heading bug
n

m

Adjust OBS

Views:
Listed below are the keyboard command equivalents for views in the view
menu. For example, pressing the "S" key results in the screen view shifting
down 4 degrees.
W

Forward

Z

Backwards

S Down 4 degrees
X Down 8 degrees
F Above 10 degrees
R

Above 40 degrees

Q Left
E

Right

Shift +

Full screen without HUD

Shift -

Full screen with HUD

=

Zoom In
Zoom Out

APPENDIX J. KEY COMMAND INSTRUCTIONS FOR COPILOT IN
AUTOMATED CONDITION

KEY COMMAND INSTRUCTIONS - COPII OT/AUTOMATED
Operating the system can be accomplised in two ways: (1) By pointing and
clicking with the mouse, or (2) Using the keyboard command equivalents
listed below:
(By depressing the key function on the left, the instrument on the right is
manipulated). For example, press the "y" key and the heading bug turns left.
Press the "u" key and the heading bug turns right.
y u Heading bug
n

m

Adjust OBS

Autopilot
Shift + 1
Shift + 4
Shift + 5
Shift + 6
Shift + 7
Shift + 8

commands:
Autopilot Disconnect
Autopilot Heading
Autopilot Nav Course 1
Autopilot Nav Course 2
Autopilot Altitude Hold
Autopilot Glide Slope 2

Views:
Listed below are the keyboard command equivalents for views in the view
menu. For example, pressing the "S" key results in the screen view shifting
down 4 degrees.
W

Forward

Z

Backwards

S Down 4 degrees
X Down 8 degrees
F Above 10 degrees
R

Above 40 degrees

Q Left
E

Right

Shift +

Full screen without HUD

Shift -

Full screen with HUD

=

Zoom In
Zoom Out

APPENDIX K. CODING FORM
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